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THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND




('VER TWO-THIRDS of the employees in the United
States today are not members of labor unions.'
Before 1978 much of the airline industry was unionized,2
but in response to the deregulation of the airline industry3
and the current state of the economy, many new non-
union airlines are entering the market.4 Further, some
Only approximately twenty-two percent of American workers belong to un-
ions. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 427. See also Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816
n.2 (1980); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
2 See Upstart Airlines Are Stinging the Big Carriers, TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 50. [here-
inafter referred to as TIME].
In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1552 (1982). The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 removed most restrictions on
airline domestic route systems. Jansonius & Broughton, Coping with Deregulation:
Reduction of Labor Costs in the Airline Industry, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 501 (1984).
[hereinafter referred to as Jansonius]. Certified airlines are now free to begin
service to new markets without extensive governmental control. Id. at n.2. Prior
to 1978, the airline industry was governed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
and by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Id. Under this regulatory scheme, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) exercised much control over carrier service on
domestic routes. Id.
For example, recently in 1983, Frontier Holdings, Inc., the parent company of
the unionized Frontier Airlines, formed Frontier-Horizon, a non-union subsidi-
ary. TIME, supra note 2, at 50-51. Other non-union carriers include Muse Air-
lines (Dallas hub), People Express (Newark hub) and America-West (Phoenix
hub). Delta Airlines is the only major non-union carrier that existed before dereg-
ulation in 1978. Id.
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unionized airlines have been relieved of their union con-
tracts in last-ditch efforts to stay in business.- It thus ap-
pears that there is a clear trend away from unions in the
airline industry.6
Unionized employees, including those in the airline in-
dustry, are protected by collective bargaining agree-
ments7 which often require an employer to have "just
.1 In mid-May of 1983, Braniff Airways filed for reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982) and also ceased all its
operations. After filing for reorganization, Braniff rejected its union contracts.
When Braniff began operating again in 1984 it had to deal with the unions that
represented Braniff employees before bankruptcy. Braniff was free, however, to
renegotiate much more favorable contracts with unions because it had a stronger
bargaining position. Unions, in this context, are virtually forced into making con-
cessions for fear of forcing the airline to liquidate. See generally, Countryman &
Bordewieck, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57
AM. BANKR. LJ. 293, 319 (1983). Since a union's major concern should be to
secure employment for its members, it obviously does not want to force a source
of employment into liquidation.
Continental Airlines has recently obtained similar relief, except, unlike Braniff,
it has continued operating. Jansonius, supra note 3, at 502 n.5. The issue of using
the Bankruptcy Code as a means to get out of union contracts was addressed re-
cently by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.
Ct. 1188 (1984). In Bildisco, a building supplies distributor filed a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy for reorganization under Chapter 11 and as "debtor in posses-
sion" sought to reject a collective bargaining agreement it had with a labor union.
Id. at 1192. The employer claimed that the rejection of the union contract would
save its business over $100,000. Id. The court held that a debtor (employer) can
reject a collective bargaining agreement if it (debtor) can show that the agreement
"burdens the [bankruptcy] estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities bal-
ance in favor of rejecting the labor contract." Id. at 1196.
In response to the Bildisco decision, in mid-July of 1984, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Code. See 98 Stat. 333 (Supp. 1984). This amendment does not
greatly alter the standard for allowing a debtor (employer) to reject a union con-
tract. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(l)-(3). It merely adds more procedures for a debtor
to follow which makes it more difficult for a debtor (employer) to reject a union
contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(I)(A) & (B) (1982).
1 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. It should be noted that even if an
airline is successful in getting out of a union contract (through bankruptcy), the
airline will still be unionized. The Railway Labor Act provides that once employ-
ees are unionized, they cannot be forced to disband their union. See generally Rail-
way Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1972). Hence, an airline such as
Continental may be released from a union contract but must still negotiate with
the union in reaching another agreement.
7 The usual product of collective bargaining is a written contract between the
employer and the union. The agreement sets forth the relationship between the
two parties, including provisions dealing with the recognition of the union as the
exclusive representative for employees in the bargaining unit. The contract also
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cause" before terminating an employee.8 Non-union
workers, who are not covered by such collective bargain-
ing agreements are not guaranteed the degree of protec-
tion given unionized workers.' Unless these non-union
employees have individually negotiated employment con-
tracts,10 they risk being subjected to the common law em-
ployment-at-will doctrine." Generally, under this
doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee at any
time for any reason. 12
The employment-at-will doctrine has been a part of em-
ployer/employee relations since the late nineteenth cen-
tury.' 3 Recently though, the doctrine has been eroded by
both federal14 and state law' 5 to give the at-will employee
more job security.' 6 The degree of protection afforded
at-will employees varies greatly from state to state.' 7
This Comment will explore the relationship between
the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine and the
includes provisions governing wages, hours, discipline, promotions and transfers.
Also, the collective bargaining agreement regulates the term and tenure of em-
ployment of the union employees. In doing so, it often includes a provision that
employees cannot be dismissed without "good" or "just" cause. R. GORMAN, LA-
BOR LAw, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Ch. XXIII, § 1 (1976).
8 Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the Em-
ployer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 202 (1982). For certain 'just cause" limitations, see,
e.g., Peerless Laundry Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 331 (1968); see generally M. TROTrA, ARBI-
TRATION OF LABOR MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 230-38 (1974).
9 Note, supra note 8, at 201.
10 In the airline industry, it is very unlikely that an employee has an individually
negotiated contract. For typical hiring process see infra notes 169-170 and accom-
panying text.
I Note, supra note 8, at 201. For a discussion of employment-at-will doctrine,
see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
", See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
13 Note, supra note 8, at 202. For evolution of doctrine see infra notes 21-27
and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 37-66 and accompanying text.
,s See infra notes 67-146 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-146 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 67-146 and accompanying text. For example, California, in
certain circumstances, requires that an at-will employee can only be discharged
for good cause. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
Texas does not recognize any exceptions to the harsh at-will rule. See infra note
175. In the past, judicial erosion of the at-will rule has typically benefited man-
agement employees. See infra note 165 for examples.
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trend toward non-union airline carriers entering the mar-
ket.' 8 More specifically, it will focus on how the erosion of
the employment-at-will doctrine will extend protection to
non-management employees of non-union carriers.' 9 Fi-
nally, it will discuss some possible alternatives that will al-
low employers in the airline industry to protect
themselves from liability which might result from dis-
charging non-union employees.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Employment-At- Will Doctrine
When a private sector employer hires an employee for
an indefinite period of time, and the employee does not
have a formal written employment contract, the employee
can generally be discharged for good or bad cause. 2' This
situation is characterized as an employment-at-will.22 The
employment-at-will doctrine developed in the United
States primarily as a result of the writings of one commen-
tator, H. G. Wood.23 Wood formulated the employment-
at-will doctrine in his 1877 work on master-servant
relationships:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite
hiring is primiafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite
hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was a day even,
but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve.
24
Though he offered no justification for his rule, which de-
18 See infra text accompanying notes 149-151.
,9 See infra text accompanying notes 165-173.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 182-199.
21 Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised by At Will Employees: A New Legal Concern
for Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265, 266 (1981).
22 Id.
23 Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974).
24 Id. (quoting H.G. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877)).
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parted from the English common law, 25 Wood's Rule be-
came the primary doctrine governing employment
duration in the United States. 26 Perhaps the judicial ac-
ceptance of Wood's doctrine can be attributed to our
country's desire to promote economic and industrial de-
velopment during the industrial revolution.27
The employment-at-will doctrine reached its peak in the
United States in the early 1900's in Adair v. United States.2 8
In Adair, a railroad employee was discharged because of
his membership in a labor union.2 9  The employee
claimed that his discharge violated a federal statute
30
which prohibited firing a railroad employee for union
membership. 3  The United States Supreme Court held
25 Note, supra note 23, at 341. The respective rights of an employer and em-
ployee under English common law came from the Statute of Labourers, which
provided that "no master can put away his servant or servant leave his master,
either before or at the end of his term, without a quarter's warning; unless upon
reasonable cause to be allowed by a justice of the peace...", 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *43 (1879). English courts followed the concepts embodied in the
Statute of Labourers, even after it was repealed. Note, supra note 8, at 206-07.
They held that an indefinite hiring was intended to be an employment contract for
one year. Id. If the employment continued for more than a year, then the em-
ployee could be discharged only after an additional year. Id.
26 Note, supra note 8, at 206. Some early leading cases applying Wood's Rule
include: Clarke v. Atlanta Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908) (con-
tract that does not state term is terminable at will); Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596,
22 P. 1126 (1889) (agreement to employ a person permanently is nothing more
than an indefinite employment terminable by either party); Martin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (contract not specifying any time
is terminable at will).
27 Note, supra note 8, at 207; see generally, Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Timefora Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976). Briefly, Wood's Rule
was in accordance with the prevalent laissezfaire ideology and freedom of contract
theory. In this context Wood's Rule was equitable. Terminable at-will employ-
ment enabled the employer to control the workplace, while at the same time al-
lowed the employee the freedom to resign if he found better employment. Note,
supra note 8, at 208.
2m 208 U.S. 161 (1908). There, the at-will rule received constitutional protec-
tion. The United States Supreme Court invalidated a federal law that prohibited
firing a railroad employee for union membership on the grounds that it interfered
with liberty and property rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 179.
2 I d. at 170.
30 Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 38 Stat. 108 (1913)).
This statute made it unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employ-
ment that an employee agree not to become a member of a labor union. Id. § 10.
3, Adair, 208 U.S. at 162.
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that the federal statute was unconstitutional because it in-
terfered with the liberty to contract and because "the
right of the employee to quit the service of the employer,
for whatever reason, is the same as the right of employer,
for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employee."3 2
The United States Supreme Court next addressed the
employment-at-will doctrine in Coppage v. Kansas. 3
There, a Kansas statute made it unlawful for employers to
require, as a condition of employment, that an employee
agree not to become a union member 4.3  The United
States Supreme Court held the Kansas statute unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 35  Specifically, the Kansas statute
32 Id. at 174-75. The Court further stated:
While . . . the right of liberty and property guaranteed by the Con-
stitution against deprivation without due process of law is subject to
such reasonable restraints as the common good or the general wel-
fare may require. . . it is not within the functions of government
• . . to compel any person in the course of his business and against
his will to accept or retain the personal services of another ....
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such la-
bor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee
to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same
as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with
the services of such employee. . . In the absence . . . of a valid con-
tract between the parties controlling their conduct towards each
other and fixing a period of service, it cannot be . . . that an em-
ployer is under any legal obligation, against his will, to retain an em-
ployee in his personal service any more than an employee can be
compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service of
another.
Id. at 174-76.
33 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
-4 Id. at 26. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4674-75 (1909).
- 236 U.S. at 26. Here, the Court stated:
Upon both principle and authority, therefore, we are constrained to
hold that the Kansas act of March 13, 1903, as construed and ap-
plied so as to punish with fine or imprisonment an employer or his
agent for merely prescribing, as a condition upon which one may
secure employment under or remain in the service of such employer,
that the employ[ee] shall enter into an agreement not to become or
remain a member of any labor organzation while so employed, is
unlawfully infringed upon an individual's liberty to con-
tract.3 6 The United States Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the at-will doctrine since Adair and Coppage.
B. Erosion of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine
1. Federal Law
a. National Labor Relations Act
The impact of the employment-at-will doctrine and,
more specifically, an employer's right to discharge an em-
ployee for joining a union, was curtailed in N.L.R.B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.." In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld the Wagner Act (now known as the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).3 8 The NLRA mandates
that employees must be allowed to organize and form un-
ions in order to bargain collectively through a representa-
tive.3 9 The Court said that "[e]mployees in industry have
a fundamental right to organize and select representatives
of their own choosing for collective bargaining; and dis-
crimination or coercion upon the part of their employer
to prevent the free exercise of this right is a proper sub-
ject for condemnation by competent legislative author-
repugnant to the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and therefore void.
Id.
36 Id. at 13.
37 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)).
39 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). This section provides
in pertinent part:
RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES AS TO ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
ETC.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this
title.
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ity. ' ' 40 The Court noted, however, that the NLRA did not
alter an employer's right to discharge for cause.4 1
The NLRA was significant because it encouraged the
formation of labor unions, which limited the application
of the employment-at-will doctrine by increasing the
number of unionized workers.4 2 These workers enter into
collective bargaining agreements which regulate the term
and tenure of their employment.43 In addition, Congress
created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)44 to
insure that employees would have the right to join labor
organizations. 45 Together, the NLRB and the courts have
given terminated employees protection under the
NLRA.46 For example, employees have been protected in
the following situations: participating in protests over the
firing of a supervisor;47 stopping work to show disagree-
ment with the employer's conduct;48 and complaining to
the employer about breaches of the collective bargaining
agreement. 49
40 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 33.
41 Id. at 45-46. Here the Court stated:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The em-
ployer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its
employees with respect to their self-organization and representa-
tion, and, on the other hand, the Board [NLRB] is not entitled to
make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of dis-
charge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such in-
timidation and coercion.
Id.
42 Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal. A Statu-
tory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 111, 127 (1982).
43 See GORMAN, supra note 7.
44 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156. (1983).
45 Hill, supra note 42, at 126. The Board consists of five members. Its function
is to process representation cases (process by which employees select labor orga-
nizations for purposes of collective bargaining) and unfair labor practices cases.
Id. at 126-27.
46 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
4 Puerto Rico Food Products Corp., 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307 (1979); see also
Hill, supra note 42, at 127 n.85.
48 Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (Board ordered
employees reinstated and made whole for any loss of pay); see also Hill, supra note
42, at 127 n.87.
49 NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (Board
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b. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196450 specifically
makes it unlawful to discriminate in employment regard-
ing hiring, firing and terms of employment on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion or national origin.5' Title VII ap-
plies to all employers "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who [have] fifteen or more employees. 5 2 Fur-
thermore, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
retaliate against an employee who has brought a claim
under Title VII.5 3
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC).54 Anyone alleging that he or
she has been aggrieved under Title VII can file a claim
ordered employer to stop unfair labor practice and to reinstate employee with
back pay); see also Hill, supra note 42, at 127 n.79.
o Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
51 Id. Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual. . . because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ...in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2.
52 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1982). It
also applies to most labor organizations. Id. § 2000e(c), (d) (1982).
5S See, Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
This section provides in part:
OTHER UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training ...programs,
to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for member-
ship, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an inves-
tigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
54 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1982).
The EEOC, through conciliation and voluntary compliance, attempts to persuade
employers to cease unfair labor practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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with the EEOC,55 which has the authority to investigate
individual claims of discrimination.5 6 The EEOC also
promotes voluntary compliance with Title VII and has the
power to bring civil actions against those employers
charged with an unlawful discriminatory practice.
c. Other Federal Laws
Other federal statutes which limit an employer's free-
dom to discharge at will include the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 58 which protects persons between forty
and seventy years old from discrimination in employ-
ment.59 The Fair Labor Standards Act 60 prohibits an em-
ployer from retaliating against an employee for exercising
protected rights under the statute.6' The Occupational
Health and Safety Act 62 also prohibits the discharge of
employees who refuse to perform hazardous work. 63 Fur-
thermore, the Consumer Credit Protection Act 64 prohibits
the discharge of an employee who has had his wages gar-
nished to pay a debt.65 Unless an employee is dismissed
55 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
56 See supra note 54.
57 Id.
5a 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
59 Id. § 31. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful to
refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate because of an individual's age. Id. § 623.
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
61 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982). Such protected
rights include filing a complaint with the Department of Labor or cooperating
with the Department of Labor during an investigation. Id. See also Hill, supra note
42, at 134.
62 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
- Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 660(c)(1) (1982); see,
e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1700 (1982).
O5 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 174(a) (1982); See also
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1982) (re-
quiring reinstatement of veterans to their former positions of employment after
discharge from the military service); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1041, 1140-1141 (1982) (preventing the discharge of employ-
ees to keep them from attaining vested pension rights); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1367 (1982) (prohibiting the discharge of em-
ployees who institute or testify at a proceeding against the employer for a viola-
tion of the Act).
in violation of one of the above statutes, he or she will
have no cause of action. 66 Hence, the at-will employee
must look elsewhere for assurances of job security.
2. State Law
Much of an employee's real protection from the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine is derived from state law.67
Some states have eradicated the employment-at-will doc-
trine to the point that an at-will employee cannot be dis-
charged without good cause. 68 In such states, the at-will
employee receives as much job security as the unionized
employee. 69 State law protecting an at-will employee is
based on two general theories: (1) contract law,70 and (2)
tort law stemming from public policy exceptions. 7'
a. Contract Law - Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Some courts have declared that the at-will em-
ployee/employer relationship is governed by a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 72 The covenant mandates
that neither party do anything that will injure the right of
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. 73 Es-
sentially, no matter what an employer says to an employee
to indicate that he or she is an at-will employee, and thus
may be dismissed without cause, the law prevents an em-
ployer from firing that employee unless it is done in good
faith.7 1 In light of this increased protection for employ-
ees, it is unlikely that an employer will consciously act in
- Hill, supra note 42, at 136.
"17 See infra text accompanying notes 68-146.
fit See infra text accompanying note 93.
- See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 72-117.
71 See infra text accompanying notes 118-146.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 74-103.
7, Fortune v. National Cash Reg. Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(1977). No case specifically defines good faith. Good faith is a factual determina-
tion which varies from situation to situation.
74 Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette - Discharging Employees,
8 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 380, 385 (1982-83).
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bad faith for fear of the possibility of large jury awards.75
Now that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
been judicially implied into the employer/employee rela-
tionship, whether an employer's actions are in good faith
is ultimately going to be determined by a jury.76
The first major case to declare the existence of a conve-
nant of good faith and fair dealing was Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co. 77 In Monge, a female employee was hired to work
as a conversion machine operator in the defendant's fac-
tory.78 The employee did not have a written contract, but
was employed under an oral contract. 79 The female em-
ployee was harrassed by her foreman and personnel man-
ager and ultimately was fired because she refused to go
out with her foreman. 80 The Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts held that "a termination by the employer of a
contract of employment-at-will which is motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best
interest of the economic system or the public good and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 8'
Here, such a termination injured the right of the em-
ployee to receive the benefits of the agreement.8
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,8" a Massachusetts
court implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the face of a written employment contract.84 In Fortune,
the employee worked for the National Cash Register
Company (NCR) under a written "salesman's contract"
7.1 Id. at 385.
76 Id. at 386. Since most juries tend to be sympathetic to the plight of the em-
ployee, an employer should avoid resolving the dispute in court.
77 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
78 Id. at 550.
710 Id. There being no written contract for a specific duration, the employee was
subject to the at-will doctrine.
80 Id.
o, Id. at 551. Here, the court cited Peterman v. International Brotherhood, 174
Cal. App. 2d 511, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959); see also Blades, Employment at Will v.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404, 1418 (1967).
" 316 A.2d at 551.
N., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
H4 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
which was terminable at will.8 5 The contract provided
that the employee was to be paid a weekly salary plus a
sales commission. 6 Apparently the employee was fired in
an effort by the employer to avoid paying the employee's
sales commissions. The court held that "NCR's written
contract contain[ed] an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and [that] a termination not made in
good faith constitute[d] a breach of the contract."88 The
court recognized the employer's need to control its
workforce but felt the adherance to a standard of good
faith would not infringe upon this need.8 9 The court also
felt that it was not radically altering the employment at-
will rule90 but instead thought it was merely recognizing
the requirement that parties to. contracts and commercial
transactions must act in good faith toward each other.9 1
Other courts also have employed the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing to protect the at-will em-
ployee.2 In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.," a California
appellate court extended the implied covenant of good
faith concept to the point where an employer could not
" Id. at 1253.
No Id.
H7 Id. at 1253-54.
"" Id. at 1255.
" Id. at 1256. It seems fair to hold employers to a standard of good faith, even
though they would complain that such a standard would infringe upon their con-
trol over the workplace, because employers often have stronger bargaining posi-
tions than employees.
vo 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
Id. See also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1981) (every contract or duty imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance or enforcement).
' See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (D.
Mass. 1980) (termination of at-will employment not made in good faith consti-
tutes a breach of contract); Mitford v. de LaSala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983)
(covenant of good faith and fair dealing prohibits firing for purpose of preventing
an employee from sharing in future profits); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus
Lines, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (implying a covenant of good
faith in a written employment contract terminable at will between a bus company
and its general manager); but see Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 11 Wis. 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)(refusing to impose a duty to terminate in good faith be-
cause to do so would "subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the amor-
phous concept of bad faith").
11. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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discharge an employee without good cause.94 In Cleary,
an airport operations agent who had worked for American
Airlines for eighteen years claimed that he was dismissed
for allegedly threatening to harm a fellow worker.95 The
court rejected the justifications for the employment-at-will
rule,96 stating that "[t]here is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract" and that "neither
party will do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement."9 The
court further held that the duty arising from the covenant
of good faith is unconditional and independent in nature
and is not controlled by events, such as actions of the em-
ployee, in the same way as conditions precedent and sub-
sequent are.98
In reaching its decision, the court balanced the compet-
ing equities between an employee's right to job security
and a employer's right to fire for cause or economic justi-
fication. 99 The court indentified two factors as being of
''paramount importance" in reaching its decision in this
particular case: (1) the longevity of service of the em-
ployee;100 and (2) the expressed policy of the employer to
hear grievances.' 0 ' The Cleary case is important because it
94 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
93 Id. at 724. The employee was also charged with theft and leaving the work
area which were both in violation of American Airline's regulations. Id.
96 See id. at 725. The at-will rule is based on the contractual concept of mutual-
ity of obligation: if an employee can terminate the employment relationship when-
ever he or she wants, the employer is also entitled to terminate the relationship at
his or her pleasure. Id.
97 Id. at 728 (quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328
P.2d 198 (1958)).
98 Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728. A condition precedent is an act or event, other
than the lapse of time, which must exist or occur before a duty of performance of
the promise arises. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 136 (1970). A condi-
tion subsequent is the existence or occurrence of a fact or event which operates to
discharge the duty of performance. Id. Hence, the court's characterization of the
duty as unconditional means that the implied covenant of good faith is not depen-
dent upon the existence of any other fact, event or occurrence.
Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
Id. The employer in Cleary had worked for American Airlines for 18 years.
Id.
1o1 Id. The employer's policy of hearing grievances involved the adoption of
specific procedures for ajudicating employee disputes. The court felt that the
COMMENTS
allowed a tort measure of damages for a cause of action
sounding in contract. ° 2 This is extremely important be-
cause one may recover punitive damages in a tort cause of
action, where only compensatory damages are allowed in
a contract claim. °10 Hence, employers who violate the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by firing an
employee in bad faith may be subject to large damage
awards in addition to back pay.
b. Implied In Fact Promise of Job Security
It is also possible for an at-will employee to achieve job
security by bringing a cause of action sounding in contract
based on the assertion that the employer impliedly prom-
isedjob security through actions or company policy.'0 4 In
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,10 5 a mid-
dle-level management employee was fired after five years
of work.'0 6 He claimed that both Blue Shield's personnel
manual and oral assurances of job security from his em-
ployer constituted an implied in fact promise ofjob secur-
ity.' O7 The Michigan Supreme Court held that "[Blue
Shield's personnel manual] may become part of [a] con-
tract either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a
result of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded
in an employer's policy statements."'' 0 8 Hence,' the em-
ployer was bound by statements assuring job security
made in its personnel manual.
existence of this policy indicated that the employer "recognized its responsibility
to engage in good faith and fair dealing rather than in arbitrary conduct." Id.
I02 d. Actually, the court said that in this specific case a tort cause of action
would also be appropriate. Id. The court reasoned that as a result of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing a duty arose on the part of American Airlines
to do nothing that would deprive the employee of the benefits of his employment.
Id.
Jos Id.
1- Note, Employment at Will: Emerging Protections for the Employee, 22 WASHBURN
L.J. 491, 508 (1983). For cases, see infra notes 105-117 and accompanying text.
,os 409 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
1- 292 N.W.2d at 883.
107 See id. at 884. It is important to note that Blue Shield's personnel manual
stated that an employee could not be fired except for cause. Id. at 884.
,om Id. at 885.
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A California appellate court held for an employee in
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. ,19 basing its decision on the im-
plied contract theory. In Pugh, the employee had worked
his way from pot scrubber to vice-president in charge of
production, before being terminated." l0 In concluding
that the implied contract (promise ofjob security) existed,
the court emphasized certain factors: (1) the length of the
employee's service,"' (2) oral assurances of job secur-
ity; ' 2 and (3) personnel policies of the employer which
assured job security. 1 3 Since the employee in Pugh had
worked for See's Candies, Inc. for thirty-two years, and
was told when he began work that his future was secure if
he was loyal to the company, the court found an implied
promise of job security." 14
The theory of an implied promise of job security has
not been widely accepted." t 5 However, where it has been
accepted, some employers have responded to this judicial
theory by putting express provisions in their employment
applications which state that an employee can be termi-
nated at will." 6 Likewise, some management and person-
nel consultants have begun to advise employers to get rid
of assurances of job security in employee handbooks and
personnel manuals." 7 The theory of an implied promise
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
Id. at 925. The employee had worked for See's Candies, Inc. for approxi-
mately 32 years. Id. at 919.
"'" Id. at 926. When the employee first began work for See's Candies, he was
told, "If you are loyal to [See's] and do a good job, your future is secure." Id. at
919.
, Id. at 925.
"1 Id. at 927.
", See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kans. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976) (manual indicating dismissal only for "good cause" not enforced); Sim-
mons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 311 So.2d 28 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (oral
promise ofjob security not enforced); Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633
S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1982) (absent specific contract term, employ-
ment relationship can be terminated at any time).
116 See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (employment application stated that employment could be terminated with
or without cause or notice). See also Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrong-
ful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (1983).
111 Brown, supra note 74, at 391-92.
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of job security has already caused and will continue to
cause employers to be more cautious in the interviewing
process.
c. Tort Law Stemming from Public-Policy Exceptions
In a growing number of states, courts have begun to
recognize a tort of wrongful or abusive discharge. 1 8 The
basis for such tort actions is usually the employer's con-
travention of some state public policy." 9 "As a general
exception to the [at-will rule] ...an employee may claim
damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for
the firing contravenes public policy.' 20 The public policy
exceptions to the at-will rule which are the basis of the
tort cause of action can be divided into three general cate-
gories: (1) exercising a statutory right or privilege; (2)
performing an important public obligation; (3) refusing to
commit an illegal act.12 1
A public policy exception to the at-will rule was first
recognized in California in Peterman v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters. 122 In Peterman, an employee of the Team-
sters Union was fired for failing to commit perjury at a
hearing. 23 The court stated that "in order to more fully
effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the
"" See infra notes 119-143 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979) (Pennsylvania); Pstragow-
ski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1977) (New Hampshire);
Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); Meyer v. Byron
Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 59, 60 n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428, 429 n.1 (1981);
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 29 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464, 473 (1981); but see
Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1981)
(under Texas law, when employee is hired for an indefinite period, employment
relationship can be ended by employer for good reason, bad reason, or no reason
at all); see also Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Austin 1982); Langford v. Home for Aged Masons, 617 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.
Civ. App. - Ft. Worth 1981).
1- Comment, Employment At Will: When Must An Employer Have Good Cause for
Discharging An Employee?, 48 Mo. L. REv. 113, 132-34 (1983).
12.. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977);
see also Olsen, supra note 21, at 268 n.17.
12 Note, supra note 116, at 1937.
122 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
12 344 P.2d at 26.
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civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlim-
ited right to discharge an employee ... when the reason
for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit per-
jury. "124 As a result, the court allowed the employee's
complaint which sought declaratory relief adjudging that
he was wrongfully discharged, as well as the employee's
claim for accrued salary since his discharge. 25 Here, the
court felt that "every impediment. . . to [the objective of
encouraging truthful testimony] must be struck down
when encountered.'1 26 Peterman is just one example in
which liability was imposed to further the public policy of
not promoting the commission of an unlawful act or the
violation of a statute. 27
Nees v. Hocks' 28 is a case in which a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will rule was used in order to further the
performance of an important public obligation.' 29 An em-
ployee was terminated for missing two weeks of work be-
cause of jury duty. 30 The court held that the employer's
motive for discharge was contrary to an important com-
munity interest and thus justified compensation of the
employee. 3
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,32 a California appel-
late court created a public policy exception for an em-
ployee who refused to commit an illegal act. 33 In Tameny,
Atlantic Richfield Company fired an employee for refus-




127 In California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1971) makes it a crime to com-
mit perjury. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f (West 197 1) makes it unlawful to solicit the
commission of perjury.
12m 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
121 536 P.2d at 512.
121oId.
'.1 Id. at 515.
1-2 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal Rptr. 839 (1980).
v- 610 P.2d at 1330.
11l4 Id. at 1331. The employee had worked for ARCO for over fifteen years. See
also, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (em-
ployee fired for refusing to violate a professional code of ethics).
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court allowed the employee to bring an action in tort and
held that an employer may not coerce compliance with
unlawful directions by discharging an employee. 35 The
court explained that, by engaging in such conduct (coerc-
ing an employee to fix prices), an employer violates a ba-
sic duty imposed by law on all employers.' 36  Thus, an
employee who suffers damages as a result can bring a tort
action for wrongful discharge against the employer." 7
Other courts have held that tort liability exists when an
employer fires an employee for exercising a statutory
right or privilege designed to protect employees within
the employment relationship. 38 The first case to allow a
cause of action based on an employee's discharge for fil-
ing a workers' compensation claim was Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co. 139 In Frampton, an employee filed a claim
' 610 P.2d at 1337.
'.' Id. The court does not explicitly define the duty violated by the employer.
Most likely the duty owed by the employer is to not force employees to commit
illegal acts. Id.
1.17 Id. Here the court explicitly said that the tort cause of action for wrongful
discharge can give rise to punitive damages. Allowing punitive damages can
prove very costly for employers. It is common knowledge that many juries will
react in sympathy for the "family man employee" who has been fired by the "large
corporation." It should also be noted that punitive damages are not allowed in
wrongful termination claims sounding in contract. Hence, it is very important for
the employer, as a planning tool, to ascertain what type of liability it could be
exposed to in discharging an employee.
'" At least five jurisdictions have applied the public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine when an employee is discharged for filing a workers' compensation
claim: Sovodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Il1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Frampton v. Central Ind.
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.
App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Lally v. Copygraphics 173 N.J. Super. 162,413
A.2d 960 (App. Div. 1980), affd 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v.
Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
At least seven state courts have refused to extend the public policy exception to
at-will employees discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim: Martin v.
Tapley, 360 So.2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.2d 89
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551
P.2d 779 (1976); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So.2d 510 (La. App.
1974); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Christy v.
Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36
N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978).
,s' 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
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after suffering a work-related injury.1 40 After receiving a
settlement, the employee was terminated.' 4' The Indiana
Supreme Court reasoned that an employee must be able
to exercise his right without fear of reprisal. 42 The court
stated that "[i]f employers are permitted to penalize em-
ployees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most
important public policy will be undermined."' 43 Frampton
is an example in which a court imposed liability on an em-
ployer in an effort to further the public policy of allowing
an employee to pursue his or her legal rights.
Courts have employed various theories to lessen the im-
pact of the harsh at-will rule. 4 4 In some jurisdictions the
at-will rule has been eradicated to the extent that an em-
ployer cannot discharge an employee without good
cause. 145 In other jurisdictions, the common law at-will
rule remains untouched. 4 6 Because of this varied treat-
ment, non-union airline employees and employers will be
affected to varying degrees depending upon the location
of the airline.
III. IMPACT ON AIRLINES
Before 1978, the airline industry was regulated and, for
the most part, unionized." 4 7 The employment-at-will doc-
trine did not play a large role in the airline industry before
1978, because most airline employees were members of
unions."' In this respect, airlines were not different than
other private companies. Only management employees
(who by nature are not unionized) were subject to the at-
will rule.




,14 See supra notes 67-143 and accompanying text.
14- See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
14, See infra note 175.
147 See supra note 3.
148 Id.
In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation
Act, 149 which removed most restrictions on airline domes-
tic route systems. 50 As a result of deregulation, new non-
union air carriers have entered the market.15' All non-
union employees of these new carriers, not just manage-
ment employees, are subject to the at-will rule. Also, the
new non-union airline employers will be affected by the
continuing erosion of the employment-at-will rule.'
52
The erosion of the at-will doctrine will affect the airline
industry in two major ways. The new causes of action, de-
veloping to different degrees in different states, will sub-
ject the non-union airline employer to increased liability
through potentially large jury awards.153 Also, as a result
of the erosion of the employment-at-will rule, all levels of
employment in the airline industry will be affected, not
just management employees. 154
A. Increased Potential Liability
When the airline industry was primarily unionized,
55
employers did not have to fear the prospect of discharg-
ing an employee. 56 Now that more non-union carriers
are entering the market, 57 airline employers must con-
sider the possibility of large jury awards resulting from
the wrongful termination of a non-union (at-will) em-
ployee. 58 If an at-will employee brings a claim for wrong-
141, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1352 (1982).
15o See supra note 3 for effects of airline deregulation.
is, See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
,' See infra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
'5- See infra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
'5 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
,56 It should be remembered that most union workers have collective bargain-
ing agreements which provide that an employee cannot be discharged without just
cause. See supra note 7. Many collective bargaining agreements contain arbitra-
tion provisions which would keep an employment dispute from going to court.
GORMAN, supra note 7. Today, if an at-will employee brings a tort cause of action,
he or she may recover both compensatory and punitive damages. See, e.g., Cleary
v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
151 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977)
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ful or abusive discharge, the employer may be subject to
liability for both compensatory and punitive damages.'5 9
Also, an employee may recover damages for mental
anguish and pain and suffering. 6 ' The real danger in this
area, as in most tort cases, is the possibility of ajury being
overly sympathetic with the aggrieved plaintiff.16' In one
case, ajury "tacked on" a $25,000 punitive damage award
to a lost pay claim of $749.162 The erosion of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine will continue to provide a judicial
forum for more employees; 63 therefore, new non-union
air carriers should strive to somehow keep from
litigating. 64
B. Extension Beyond Management Employees
The erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine has typ-
ically benefited managerial employees who work under
oral contracts. 65 In the airline industry, however, the de-
(court affirmed $116,391.10 in damage award); Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 384
N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978) (court stated that punitive damages would be proper for a
wrongful discharge claim sounding in tort).
159 See, e.g. Tameny, supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text; Kelsay, 74 I1.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton, supra notes 139-143 and accompanying
text; Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980) (discharged
employee is not limited to loss of wages but may seek compensatory and punitive
damages); Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (when cause
of action sounds in tort, rules relating to tort damages are applicable).
- See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 247 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (em-
ployer's conduct surrounding discharge amounted to outrageous conduct causing
severe emotional distress).
,' For example, one can imagine a jury showing much sympathy towards an
employee who supports a family and who is discharged after years of faithful ser-
vice by a seemingly cold and impersonal company. See Brown, supra note 74, at
390.
162 Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The actual
$25,000 punitive damage claim was reversed because the case was the first in the
jurisdiction to allow a wrongful discharge cause of action. The court did state that
in the future punitive damages would be proper in this type of case since prospec-
tive defendants are aware that such a cause of action exists. 384 N.E.2d at 360.
,63 By creating new causes of action, state courts have enabled non-union em-
ployees to contest their discharges in court. For examples see supra notes 67-143
and accompanying text.
-4 See supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text for dangers of being dragged
into court by a discharged at-will employee. See infra notes 181-199 and accompa-
nying text for possible ways to avoid litigating in court.
165 See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
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mise of the at-will rule will not only benefit management,
but other employees as well.' 66 For some of the new non-
union carriers, 167 flight attendants, pilots, ticketing agents
and ground crew could all be classified as at-will employ-
ees because they are not members of labor unions. 16  As
long as an airline employee is not working under a formal
written contract for a specific duration, he or she will be
considered an at-will employee. 169 The employee is hired
917 (1981) (employee was vice-president in charge of production and on the
board of directors of See's Candies Northern California subsidiary); Petermann v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (employee was secretary and treasurer of the union); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (em-
ployee held a middle level management position with Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982)
(employee was an executive for McGraw-Hill, Inc., a publishing company). It
should also be noted that by nature management employees are not unionized,
because managers are supervisory, decision-making personnel who are less in
need of collective bargaining and who are more like employers than employees.
Management employees will be subject to the at-will rule if there is no written
contract for a specific duration. See generally GORMAN, supra note 7.
-o Not all commentators agree that the erosion of the at-will rule will benefit
employees other than management. For a conflicting point of view see Note, supra
note 116, at 1937-1951. In the airline industry, all non-union employees will re-
ceive more job protection as a result of the erosion of the at-will rule. Pilots may
not be affected much by this development however, because they are typically
members of the Airline Pilots Association even where other airline employees are
not unionized.
167 See supra note 4.
-e For definition of an at-will employee see supra notes 21-27 and accompany-
ing text.
169 Airline employees of Frontier-Horizon, a new non-union carrier, do not
have formal written contracts. Telephone conversation with Mr. Ned Walker,
Vice President of Public Relations, Frontier-Horizon Airlines, February 26, 1984.
A typical at-will employee scenario is as follows: A person fills out an application
for a job as a ticket agent. The applicant may receive some literature about the
airline at this time. The applicant then has an interview or a series of interviews. If
the applicant is to be hired, he or she will receive an oral offer of employment for
a specified salary. Often times, the employer will send a letter confirming the oral
offer. The new employee will most likely be given an employee manual or hand-
book. The handbook contains information regarding vacations, sick pay and
health insurance. Id. The new employee is "at-will" and under the common law
employment-at-will doctrine can be discharged at anytime. See supra notes 21-
27 and accompanying text. Many employers may get-into trouble by using such
phrases as "job security," "permanent employment," or "discharge for good
cause," in their employee handbooks. Courts in certain states may interpret these
phrases as contractual commitments. See supra notes 105-117 and accompanying
text.
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as an at-will employee and must look to state law for as-
surances of job security. 70
There is no reason to believe that courts will alter their
courses and embrace the common law employment-at-will
doctrine in its harshest form. 171  Actually, the trend ap-
pears to be toward a further erosion of the at-will rule in
an effort create job security for non-union employees. 72
That employees of new non-union carriers will come
under the at-will rule should cause airline employers to
take action to avoid future liability. 73
IV. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION
Judicial approaches to the employment at will doctrine
vary greatly. 174 Some state courts still enforce the harsh
common law rule, 175 while others hold that an at-will em-
ployee cannot be discharged without good cause. 176 It is a
virtual certainty that the employment-at-will doctrine will
continue to erode on a nationwide basis.' 77
The demise of the at-will rule should have a great im-
pact on the new non-union air carriers entering the mar-
170 See supra notes 105-117 and accompanying text.
171 See Brown, supra note 74, at 404. There, a table of cases indicates that many
states are continuing to recognize exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
For a description of the common law employment-at-will doctrine, see supra note
20-26 and accompanying text. For cases applying the rule as recently as the early
1970's, see Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970); Entis v.
Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964); Gressley v. Williams,
193 Cal.App.2d 636, 14 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1961).
172 See supra text accompanying note 171.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 155-164.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 67-146.
175 See, e.g., Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (no
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, where an employee was terminated
for missing work to serve on grand jury); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga.
612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978) (per curiam) (employer's motive for discharge is irrele-
vant because the at-will doctrine insulates the employer from liability); United
States Auto Ass'n v. Tull, 571 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1978)
(employee who is working under an oral contract for no specific duration can be
discharged at any time without cause).
176 See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980).
- See supra text accompanying notes 171-173.
ket. 7 8 Job protection will be extended, through the
creation of new judicial remedies, to employees other
than those in management.1 79 The creation of new causes
of action for discharged employees will increase non-
union airline employers' potential liability. 80 The public-
ity of jury trials resulting from the erosion of the at-will
rule might also adversely affect the non-union employer.
Non-union airline employers should fear having to litigate
the claims of discharged employees in front ofjuries. The
goal of the non-union airline employer is somehow to
avoid litigating, while at the same time preserve a conge-
nial employment relationship with its employees. Em-
ployers should take certain precautions in an effort to
reduce potential future liability.' 8'
A. Employee Handbooks or.Personnel Manuals
Employers should avoid making promises of or even
reference to "job security," "permanent employment," or
"discharge for good cause" in their handbooks or person-
nel manuals. 82 If such statements are made, employers
risk having courts interpret them as contractual commit-
ments.18 3 Of course, if an employer desires to make such
promises as job security or discharge only for cause, it is
permissible to include them in employer manuals. 84
Most importantly, an employer should say exactly what it
means with regard to assurances of job security in its
handbook or manual. 85 It might be plausible to include a
178 See supra text accompanying notes 165-170.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 155-170.
10 See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
18, For such precautions, see infra text accompanying notes 182-199.
182 Brown, supra note 74, at 391.
-3 Id.
184 Id. An employer probably would desire to make such promises as a public
relations tool. Here, an employer must weigh the public relations benefits against
the legal drawbacks before making a decision to include such statements.
1". Id. This also applies to the interviewing process. An interviewer should not
make rash statements such as, "If you are looking for job security, this is the
place," if the employer does not want to comply with such a statement. It is a
very good idea to have some sort of written guidelines on what interviewers
should avoid saying. This will serve as both a means to educate interviewers, as
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phrase such as the following: "Discharge for any cause at
employer's discretion, provided that employee has been
given proper notice." 86
B. Employee Evaluations
Employee evaluations should be conducted on a regu-
lar basis. 87 The evaluations should clearly reflect the em-
ployee's performance. 8 8 It is much better to criticize an
employee than let a problem progress.'8 9 By identifying
the poor performance of an employee, and including such
observations in the employee's personnel file, the em-
ployer provides identifiable objective criteria for discharg-
ing the employee. 190 At the same time, the employer
makes the employee aware of the problem and thus gives
that employee a chance to remedy it.' 9 '
well as a piece of evidence on the issue of what interviewers promise. Hence,
written evidence can be used to rebut the plaintiffs claims at trial. Id. at 392.
186 Id. at 392; see, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text.
187 Brown, supra note 74, at 393. If employee evaluations are conducted on a
regular basis, incompetent or poor employees can be identified. These evalua-
tions can serve as evidence that the employer acted in good faith in discharging an
employee. Without the evaluations, it might appear that the employer "abused




19, The elements of a good evaluation system are outlined by R. Lawrence
Ashe, Jr., in an article in the Autumn 1980 issue of EEO TODAY. The article
provides:
1. Clear written instructions to performance raters;
2. Relevant training for performance raters;
3. Documented performance-rater familiarity with the nature and
importance of the various job duties on which the employee is being
rated and with the "ratee's" actual performance of those duties;
4. Design and use of a performance appraisal form which is as job
related and easily understood as the circumstances allow;
5. Reasonable precautions against improper performance-rater
bias of any kind;
6. At least two-level performance rater review and sign-off;
7. Central monitoring (usually by the personnel department) to en-
sure use of uniform performance rating standards;
8. Strenuous efforts to achieve accuracy rather than the more typi-
cal excessive leniency;
9. Employee review and right to comment;
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C. Internal Grievance Procedure; Arbitration
An employer should avoid having a jury decide the va-
lidity of the employer's termination of an employee. 92
Most juries would probably have little difficulty identify-
ing with a discharged employee.193 To avoid that eventu-
ality, some kind of internal grievance system should be
instituted and included in the employee manual or hand-
book. 94 More importantly, the procedure should be fair
and impartial.' 95 If the internal grievance system appears
outwardly fair, it may be used as evidence that the em-
ployer has treated the employee fairly.'9 6 This evidence
not only will be useful at trial, but also could discourage
possible plaintiffs from bringing suit.
10. Employee concurrence (or specified disagreement) with the
listing of major duties on which performance was rated;
11. Employee sign-off to signify having read the review but not
necessarily having concurred in the rating received;
12. Right of employee appeal within a reasonable time;
13. Statistical checks for adverse impact and for any unusual rating
pattern requiring specific investigation; and
14. Specific and mutually agreeable goals.
Ashe, EEO TODAY (Autumn 1980) (quoted in Brown, supra note 74, at 394).
192 See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
,-. Id.
194 Putting such information into employee handbooks, as a practical matter,
may not be good from an employee relations standpoint. The employer risks
alienating employees by telling them in advance what will happen if they have a
complaint. The employer should strive to explain, in a realistic and fair fashion,
that employees will be treated fairly if there is a complaint.
From a legal standpoint, the inclusion of information such as internal grievance
procedures, arbitration provisions, and expected standards of employee perform-
ance, makes sense. This information can provide for equitable dispute resolution
without letting a sympathetic jury make the final decision. Also, such provisions
in employee handbooks can be evidence of an employer's good faith efforts to
accommodate his employees and thereby be beneficial to an employer as a shield
against future liability. See Brown, supra note 74, at 390-91, 399.
.... Brown, supra note 74, at 399.
"1m id. A good internal grievance procedure contains two parts:
(I) Complaint to the immediate supervisor - employees should be
encouraged to discuss problems with their immediate supervisor.
(2) Complaint to next level of management - if like problem was
not solved by the immediate supervisor, employees should be ad-
vised to present their claims in writing to the next level of manage-
ment. Here, after discussing the problem with the employee and his
supervisor, the upper level manager should reach a written decision.
Id. at 399-400.
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If the problem is not solved through internal grievance
procedures, then the employee should be encouraged to
seek arbitration. 97 The employer should provide for vol-
untary and binding arbitration, possibly as the final stage
of an overall grievance resolution program."9 8 This provi-
sion should be part of the employee manual or hand-
book.' 99 Essentially, it should state that if the internal
grievance procedure fails to reach a resolution of the dis-
pute, then the employer and employee agree to submit to
voluntary and binding arbitration of the dispute.
Even if the above suggestions are implemented, the
erosion of the at-will rule will still have an unfavorable ef-
fect on non-union airlines. The creation of new judicial
remedies, which may extend job security to non-union
employees, will also increase a non-union employer's
costs. Most likely these increased costs will be passed on
to non-union employees in the form of lower wages and
197 It should be noted that arbitration has to be mandated by either a statute or
a contract. In either of these cases, a court will view an arbitrator's decision as
binding as to the issue that was before the arbitrator. See GORMAN, supra note 7.
,98 Brown, supra note 74, at 400.
199 See supra note 184 for drawbacks of including such a provision in an em-
ployee handbook.
An arbitration agreement should include the following:
1. The dispute and issues to be resolved;
2. A statement indicating that the employee has had the opportu-
nity and has been encouraged by the employer to consult an
attorney;
3. The method of choosing the arbitrator, paying for the arbitra-
tion, and deciding who is to pay the employee's attorney's fees if he
or she is successful;
4. The kind of relief that may be awarded by the arbitrator;
5. The amount and type of permitted discovery;
6. Pre-arbitration procedures such as exchange of witness lists, ex-
hibits, and experts' names, if any;
7. Conduct of the hearing, including evidentiary standards to be
used, whether a court reporter or other transcription device will be
used, time and place of the hearing, etc.;
8. Briefing schedules;
9. Release of all claims by the employee in exchange for agreement
to arbitrate; and
10. Agreement that the arbitrator's decision is to be final and bind-
ing and reviewable only for fraud, bias, or arbitrator misconduct.
Brown, supra note 74, at 400-401.
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fewer benefits, which negates the employee's supposed
gains.
As a result, it is quite possible that such non-union air-
line employees will want to join unions so that they will
not have to worry about job security and might receive
higher wages. Joining a union in this context will only
serve to perpetuate the problem since the proliferation of
labor unions is one major cause of the difficulties in the
airline industry. Labor unions in America arose because
of a need to protect the worker. 20 0 Ironically, though, la-
bor unions appear to be a partial cause of the economic
difficulties of many unionized airlines. 20 1 This is illus-
trated by the fact that some airlines have used the Bank-
ruptcy Code as a means to reject a union contract.20 2 In
these cases "secure" employees suddenly find themselves
out of a job. Unions can even cause a bankrupt airline to
liquidate if they refuse to make any concessions in the re-
negotiation of a union contract.
Since deregulation, 20 3 non-union carriers have entered
the market and become competitive because of lower la-
bor costs. The trend of non-union airlines entering the
market has increased the number of non-union workers in
the airline industry. On the surface, the judicial erosion
of the employment-at-will rule appears to greatly benefit
non-union employees. In reality, though, if non-union
employers pass on the costs of greater financial exposure
to their employees, the benefits to the employees will be
negated. Hopefully, non-union airline employees won't
seek to unionize. Receiving lower pay in the short run is
preferable to fueling a union movement that has usurped
its role, and as such, has overburdened many airlines.
2- See generally, E. LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR: HISTORIC TRIALS
SHOWING THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1960).
1'1' See supra note 5; see also 114 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 224 (Nov. 21, 1983) (re-
porting that same stewardesses of Continental Airlines were receiving $39,000 a
year before Continental filed for bankruptcy).
202 See supra note 5.
20 See supra note 3.
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